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MUCH ADO ABOUT RANDOLPH: THE SUPREME
COURT REVISITS THIRD PARTY CONSENT

Stephanie M. Godfrey*
Kay Levine**

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a surprising break with its decades-long trend towards expanding the consent
doctrine, the Supreme Court recently held that a co-tenant could not give valid consent
for police to search a residence for evidence where the target of the search was
l
physically present and expressly objected to the search. In Georgia v. Randolph, the
2006 Court resolved a split in the lower courts over whose wishes should control law
enforcement authority to conduct a warrantless search when co-tenants disagree. While
this ruling lies at the intersection of criminal procedure and constitutional law, its
ultimate significance as a tool for strengthening Fourth Amendment privacy protections
remains uncertain.
The case involved a fairly narrow issue, but Randolph generated a heated debate
amongst the members of the Court. Notable as the first case in which the newly
appointed Chief Justice filed a dissenting opinion, Randolph features a somewhat
persuasive majority opinion, two separate concurrences, and three separate dissents. The
decision's six parts encompass, among other things, disagreements over the correct
interpretation of precedent, a duel over the proper use of originalism, and a debate over
the case's relevance to the issue of domestic violence.
Although Randolph reaffirms the centuries-old notion of the inherent sanctity of
the home, the case is not without its flaws. The narrowness of its holding, the Court's
use of social expectations, and errors in its discussion of exigent circumstances may
compromise the decision's precedential value. In addition, the Court's lack of clarity
with respect to two issues-the limits on removal of targets from the scene of the search
and the relevance of the plain view seizure doctrine to searches conducted among
disagreeing co-tenants-may generate much future litigation.
* Stephanie Godfrey is a J.D. Candidate, 2008, at Emory University School of Law.
** Kay Levine is an associate professor of law at Emory University School of Law.

1. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
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This article provides an overview of the Supreme Court's third party consent
jurisprudence, analyzes the Court's holding in Georgia v. Randolph, and discusses the
holding's potential impact on future third-party consent cases. The analysis proceeds as
follows: Part II provides an overview of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence with respect to consent searches. Part III examines the state of third party
3
2
consent after the pivotal cases of United States v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez,
which together gave rise to the common authority and apparent authority doctrines
underpinning the Court's understanding of consent. Part IV analyzes the Court's
decision in Randolph, paying particular attention to the Court's difficulty in reconciling
the holding in that case with Matlock. Part V assesses possible limitations of the holding
in Randolph, including its narrowness, its use of social expectations, and its treatment of
exigent circumstances, and Part VI addresses future concerns posed by ambiguous
language in the majority opinion with respect to the removal of targets from the premises
being searched and the relevance of the plain view doctrine to situations similar to
Randolph.

II.
A.

CONTEXT: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CONSENT SEARCHES

The Fourth Amendment: Origins
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
4
place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

Following the American struggle against British colonial domination and abuse,
the framers drafted the Fourth Amendment in an effort to help safeguard individual
liberty against unchecked governmental intrusion. 5 Of particular importance to the
framers was preservation of the home as a place of refuge and safety. 6 While early
British law also recognized the inherent sanctity of the home, 7 the British government's
willingness to abandon such a long-held principle for its own ends convinced the framers
that more proactive steps were necessary to prevent similar abuses in the United States.
As a result, the Fourth Amendment was adopted, in part, as a means of ensuring that
2. 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
3. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. "[T]he Fourth Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, 'was intended to be an additional
structure to keep the federal government within its prescribed boundaries."' Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs
Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged,82 B.U. L. Rev. 895, 970
(2002) (quoting Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution. Freedom of the Press in America
48 (U. Calif. Press 1991)).
6. See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (stating that the core of the Fourth Amendment is concerned
with "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion" (quoting Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
7. See e.g. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604) ("[T]he house of every one is to him as

his ... castle and fortress, as well for his defen[s]e against injury and violence, as for his repose.").
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American citizens would no longer be subjected to the types of "unrestrained and
8
the British were prone to conduct in the years
judicially unsupervised searches"
9
Revolution.
the
preceding
B.

FourthAmendment Search Jurisprudence

In light of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the touchstone of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
reasonableness. Using the two-pronged approach originally articulated by Justice Harlan
in Katz v. United States to help distinguish reasonable searches from unreasonable
ones, 10 the courts assess whether a search's target had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the location searched.]1 Under this approach, a target must have a subjective
expectation of privacy that is recognized by society as reasonable 12 for the Fourth
Amendment to apply.
In more recent times, the desire for far-reaching privacy protections under the
Fourth Amendment has come into conflict with concerns for the public interestspecifically, the notion that some privacy must be sacrificed for the greater goods of
public safety and expediency in criminal investigations.' 3 In response, the Court has
begun balancing the two interests 14 in a manner that has often proved detrimental to the
integrity of the Fourth Amendment. It has created several exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, including exigent circumstances, 15 the automobile
exception, 16 and consent. 17 Despite the Supreme Court's assurance that exceptions to
8. Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional
Interpretation20 (Johns Hopkins Press 1966).
9. See Nathan Vaughan, Student Author, Overgeneralization of the Hot Pursuit Doctrine Provides
Another Blow to the Fourth Amendment in Middletown v. Flinchum, 37 Akron L. Rev. 509, 513 (2004)
(discussing the "countless searches based on little or even no suspicion" directed at colonists in the early 1700s
(footnote omitted)); see also Landynski, supra n. 8 (abuses were largely concentrated within the fifteen years
before the Revolution).
10. See Kvtlo, 389 U S. at 33 ("As Justice Harlan's oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable."); see also Katz v. US., 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that "a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy").
II See eg. US. v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1983); Widgren v. Maple Grove, 429 F.3d 575, 585
(6th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Taketa, 932 F,2d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 1991); US. v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th
Cir. 1995).
12. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. See Vaughan, supra n. 9, at 514-15. This sentiment bears special significance in a post-9/1 1 world in
which there is heightened concern for national security. See Matthew Brezinski, FortressAmerica, N.Y. Times
Mag. 38 (Feb. 23, 2003) (discussing the nation's attempt to balance public safety and privacy after 9/11).
14. See Wyo. v Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (evaluation of the reasonableness of a search must
consider, "on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests"); Camara v
Mun Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Vaughan, supra n. 9, at 515.
15. An exigent circumstance is one in which "a police officer must take immediate action to effectively
make an arrest, search, or seizure for which probable cause exists " Black's Law Dictionary 260 (Bryan A.
Gardner ed., 8th ed., West 2004). Threats to life or safety, imminent escape of a suspect, or the removal or
destruction of evidence are possible exigent circumstances. Id.; see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
see e.g. Ill. v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (holding that temporary seizure of the defendant's residence
was justified by the "specially pressing [and] urgent law enforcement need" to preserve evidence).
16. Under the automobile exception, police officers may search a vehicle without a warrant so long as they
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the Fourth Amendment's requirements amount to only "a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions, ' 18 many have decried these alterations as erosive 19 of
the Fourth Amendment's protections. In particular, concern over the diminishing scope
of individual privacy has been quite persistent with regard to the ever-expanding reach of
20
the consent exception.
C.

The Consent Exception
It is generally recognized that a warrantless search is unreasonable per se under the

terms of the Fourth Amendment. 2 1 However, a search conducted pursuant to a target's
consent is among those few "jealously and carefully drawn" 22 exceptions to the warrant

requirement. 2 3 Where consent is "freely and voluntarily given," 24 law enforcement
officers may rely on such consent as the basis for conducting a search in the absence of a
warrant. Any search conducted pursuant to such consent falls outside the bounds of the

Fourth Amendment's protection.
Courts assess the voluntariness of consent by examining the totality of the
circumstances to ensure that the consenting party has not been coerced. 25 Thus, the
factors

relevant

to

the

voluntariness

determination

will

encompass

"both

the

characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." 26 It is not necessary,

however, that the consenting party be aware of his right to refuse consent. 27
28
knowledge is only one of the many factors considered in a court's analysis.

Such

have probable cause to believe there is evidence in the vehicle. Carroll v U.S, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
17. "[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable
cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)
(citations omitted).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted).
19. See e.g. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 512 (1991) ("[T]he warrant has evolved from being an absolute
prerequisite ... to a procedural requirement sometimes acknowledged and rarely enforced." (internal citations
omitted)), Charles W. Chotvacs, Student Author, The Fourth Amendment WarrantRequirement Constitutional
Protection or Legal Fiction?Noted Exceptions Recognized by the Tenth Circuit, 79 Denv. U. L. Rev. 331, 331
(2002) (commenting that the Supreme Court's assurance that there are only a few narrow exceptions to the
warrant requirement "seem[s] to be fatally flawed" (footnote omitted)); see also Nancy J. Kloster, Student
Author, An Analysis of the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Regarding Voluntary Third Party
Consent Searches: The Defendant's Perspective, 72 N.D. L. Rev. 99, 104 (1996); Michael C. Wieber, Student
Author, The Theory and Practiceof Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an Officer's Reasonable Belief about a Third
Party'sAuthority to Consent Does Not Protecta CriminalSuspect's Rights, 84 J. Cnm. L. & Criminology 604,
628 (1993).
20. See supra n. 19.
21. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; see also Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
22. Jones v US., 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
23. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219. Despite the Court's assertion to the contrary, the view that the exceptions
to the warrant requirement have been "jealously and carefully drawn" is hardly sustainable.
24. Bumper v N.C., 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (footnote omitted).
25. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 ("[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances.").
26. Id.at 226.
27. Id.at 234.
28. Id.at 249.
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ThirdParty Consent

Initially, only the target of a search could provide consent; however, that limitation
began to disappear in 1961 when the Supreme Court first heard arguments seeking to
establish the validity of third party consent.29 Rejecting property law as the guiding
force on matters of third party consent, the Supreme Court held in Chapman v. United
States that a landlord could not consent to the search of the tenant's residence merely
The Court later reached a similar conclusion
because of his property interest therein.
in Stoner v. California, where it invalidated a hotel clerk's consent to the search of a
guest's room. 3 1 At that time, it appeared the Court was moving in the direction of using
agency theory as a basis for third party consent, as the consent in Stoner was invalidated
in part because the guest had not given implied or express consent for the clerk to enter
the room without his knowledge. 32 However, that line of reasoning was later foreclosed
with the Supreme Court's adoption of the common authority approach in United States v.
Matlock,33 which was later modified by the apparent authority doctrine of Illinois v.
Rodriguez.
1.

34

Matlock and Common Authority

The main doctrinal concern before Matlock was whether third party consent should
be permitted under an agency theory (as suggested in Stoner35 ) or under an assumption
of risk theory, which surfaced in Frazier v. Cupp.36 In Frazier, the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless search of a duffel bag by finding that the target, who shared the bag
with his cousin, had assumed the risk that his cousin might permit others (including
police) to look inside the bag. 3 7 This latter theory ultimately captured the attention of
the Court, as it adopted in United States v. Matlock a theoretical basis for third party
consent that incorporated considerations of assumption of risk.38
The issue in Matlock was whether the consent of the target's common-law wife
was sufficient to validate a warrantless search of their shared living space for purposes of
gathering evidence against him. 39 In that case, police officers arrested a bank robbery
40
suspect, Matlock, in the front yard of his home and placed him in a nearby squad car.
The officers then met Mrs. Graff at the front door of the home, and she told them that she

29. See Chapman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
30. Id. at 616-17.
31. 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
32. Id.
33. 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
34. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
35. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489.
36. 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
37. Id.
38. See Matlock, 415 U S. at 171 & n. 7.
39. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166.
40 Id. The police did not ask the suspect if he lived at the home or if he would consent to it being
searched. id.
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and Matlock shared a room there.4 1 Graff consented to a search of the home, which
yielded $4,995 in cash as evidence of the suspect's alleged bank robbery. 4 2 Matlock
asserted that Graff's consent was insufficient to support a search conducted against him
and moved to suppress the evidence obtained.43 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
Matlock's argument and concluded that Graffts consent was sufficient to validate a
search against him because of their shared living arrangement and common authority
44
over the space.
The Court held that the consent of the absent suspect's 4 5 common law wife was
legally sufficient to validate a warrantless search of the home because she "possessed
common authority over... the premises or effects sought to be inspected. '' 6
Specifically, the Court concluded that it could be inferred from the co-occupants' mutual
use of property that "any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his
own right" and that by living together the co-inhabitants have each "assumed the risk
that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched., 47 The Court
reiterated that this concept of common authority rested not on the law of property 48 but
on the mutual use of the property and the reasonable inferences which could be drawn
from that mutual use. 4 9 In other words, by sharing a room with Mrs. Graff, Matlock
assumed the risk that in his absence she might allow another to enter the common space
they shared and retrieve evidence against him. He thus retained no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their shared living space, rendering the search conducted by the
officers outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Notwithstanding Justice Douglas' dissent, in which he expressed the belief that
exceptions to the warrant requirement encompassed a much narrower range of
possibilities than those entertained by the majority, 5 0 the majority opinion in Matlock
reaffirmed the validity of third party consent and provided a welcome clarification of the
Court's position on the subject. The Court's shaping of the doctrine did not end there,
however, as law enforcement agencies continued to push the bounds of permissible
conduct with respect to searches and seizures.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 166-67.
43. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166-167.
44. Id. at 171, 177. The money was found in a closet in a bedroom shared by Matlock and Mrs. Graff. Id.
at 166-167.
45. Id. at 170. At the time Graff gave her consent, Matlock was in the back seat of a squad car parked near
the property. Thus, one can argue that he was not actually absent from the scene. Perhaps the Court
characterized him as such because he never explicitly refused consent. However, law enforcement never
explicitly asked for his consent either
46 Id at 171.
47 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7.
48. Id.; see Chapman, 365 U.S. at 617.
49. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7.
50. According to Justice Douglas, only a "grave emergency, such as the imminent loss of evidence or
danger to human life" would excuse the government's failure to obtain a warrant. Id. at 187 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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2.

Illinois v. Rodriguez and Apparent Authority

Nearly two decades later, Illinois v. Rodriguez added a more controversial wrinkle
to the concept of third party consent. Unlike Matlock, which went relatively undisputed
because of the clarification it brought to the doctrine, Rodriguez was not so wellregarded. Specifically, the case's expansion of third party consent doctrine to include the
murky concept of apparent authority, a concept which the Court appeared to have
rejected in Stoner,5 1 was viewed as erosive rather than supportive of Fourth Amendment
52
protections.
At issue in Rodriguez was whether a third party who did not possess common
authority, but whom the police reasonably believed possessed common authority, could
be relied upon for third party consent. 53 In that case, police accompanied Gail Fischer,
who bore the signs of a severe beating, to the home of her former live-in boyfriend
whom she claimed was responsible for the assault. 54 Fischer had a key to the suspect's
apartment, referred to it as "our" apartment, and spoke of clothes and furniture which she
was keeping there.5 5 For this reason, the police assumed that she had the authority to
permit them to enter the apartment without a search warrant. 56 After Fischer unlocked
the door for them, the police entered the apartment, found drug paraphernalia, and
arrested the sleeping suspect for possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. 5 7 The suspect subsequently moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search
because Fischer was not living there
at the time and, therefore, had no authority to
58
consent to a search of the premises.
The Supreme Court concluded that, notwithstanding Fischer's lack of actual
authority over the premises, the police could still rely upon her consent if they
reasonably believed that she had the necessary authority. 59 In this way, the Rodriguez
decision pushed the possibility of third party consent beyond the requisite "common
authority" 6 ° discussed in Matlock and into the realm of apparent authority. 6 1 The Court
premised its finding on the notion that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit searches
conducted against an occupant's wishes but rather that it protects only against

51. Stoner, 376 U.S. at488 ("[T]he rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by
strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority."').
52. See e.g. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by DisregardingDoctrine. How Illinois v. Rodriguez
Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police
Error, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. I (1991).
53. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.

54.
55.
56
57.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 180.
Id.

58. Rodriguez, 497 U.S at 180.

59. ld.at 186.
60. 415 U.S. at 171.
61 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186. The Court noted the difference between what police were told at the time
and what they learned later about the Fischer-Rodriguez living situation and remanded the case to the Illinois

Appellate Court to decide whether the former facts were sufficient to create the reasonable appearance of
authority. Id.at 189.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 9
TULSA LA WRE VIEW

[Vol. 42:731

"unreasonable" searches. 62 Because "reasonableness" in the context of probable cause
findings and search warrants, two other methods of validating searches, does not require
that the government be "factually correct," the Court surmised that the government need
63
not be factually correct in gauging an individual's ability to consent to a search either.
Thus, after Rodriguez, police who incorrectly believed a third party had authority to
consent would not be penalized
for conducting a warrantless search so long as their
64
belief was a reasonable one.
The outcome in Rodriguez was not well-received outside the law enforcement
community. Critics assailed the result as yet another blow to Fourth Amendment
protections. 65 One of the major concerns was that the case had gone too far in
expanding police powers at the expense of individual privacy protections. 66 Errors and
actions that were inexcusable before the ratification of apparent authority had become,
under Rodriguez, constitutionally reasonable; critics feared these practices would
therefore become more commonplace afterward, posing a serious threat to individual
67
rights.
Moreover, the majority's validation of consent given by third parties with no
68
common authority undermined the assumption-of-risk rationale relied upon in Matlock.
As the dissent pointed out in Rodriguez, apparent authority permits the "trampling [of]
the rights of a person who has not.., relinquished any of his privacy expectation." 6 9 By
detaching third party consent from the "relinquishment of expectations" theory that had
previously justified its warrant-exception status, the Court subordinated reliance on
precedent to the further expansion of police powers, resulting in a more restricted Fourth
Amendment.
III.

POST-RODRIGUEZ: THE CASE OF THE PRESENT OBJECTOR

In the shadow of these decisions-Matlock and Rodriguez-and of these
concerns-expediency in criminal procedure and individual privacy-the Supreme
Court's most recent third party consent case made its way through the justice system.

62 Id. at 183 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).
63 Id. at 184-86.
64. Id. at 188-89.
65. See e.g. S. Jeffrey Gately, Student Author, Criminal Procedure-Searchand Seizure-A Reasonable
Belief That a Third Party Had Authority to Consent to a Search Is an Exception to the Warrant Requirement,
22 St. Mary's L.J. 541, 554 (1990) (With Rodriguez, "the Court overlooks the intent of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment's authors to restrict the government's power to impinge upon the citizens' right of privacy. In so
doing, the Court has significantly diminished the [F]ourth [A]mendment's power to protect individual
privacy."); Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 175, 184
(1991) ("The Rodriguez approach, while supplying strong support for law enforcement, completely ignores the
constitutional interest of the privacy holder.").
66. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 198 (Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
67. See Davies, supra n. 52, at 96 ("Rodriguez may well turn out to be a major step toward a generalized
doctrine of forgiveness of all kinds of 'understandable' police errors under the colloquialized notion of
,reasonableness."' (footnote omitted)).
68. Elizabeth A. Wright, Student Author, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
Refusal, Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1841, 1859 (2005) ("Rodriguez cuts the legs
out from under the assumption of the risk theory.").
69. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 198 (Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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Although Matlock and Rodriguez helped to flesh out modem third party consent
doctrine, they did not specifically address the issue at the core of Georgia v. Randolph:
whether a present, objecting target could overrule a co-tenant's consent. 70 While
numerous lower courts had already tackled the issue of disagreeing co-tenants, 7 1 a split
of authority had emerged over what the correct outcome should be.
A.

The Majority View

After Rodriguez, a majority of state courts that addressed the issue of disagreeing
co-tenants held that a present target's objection could not invalidate another co-tenant's
consent to a warrantless search of their shared premises. 72 By combining the common
authority approach from Matlock with their knowledge of the trend evident in Rodriguez
toward expansion of the consent exception, numerous courts concluded that the opinion
of present objectors was irrelevant in the face of their co-tenant's consent. 73 Finding that
a co-tenant who had voluntarily shared his authority over a common space had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in that space, the courts saw no reason to allow the cotenant's reasonable objection to constrain officers' authority to search.
Although the holding in Matlock stated that a third party possessing common
authority may consent to a search in his co-tenant's absence, courts interpreted this rule
very broadly and successfully used it to validate consent in the face of present, objecting
co-tenants. In doing so, proponents of the majority view pointed to the fact that,
although the holding in Matlock applied to absent targets, the defendant in the case was
actually in a squad car right outside the home74-not present at the threshold but not
altogether absent from the scene either. 75 Thus, although the Supreme Court stated that
it was granting the authority to consent only against absent co-tenants, in Matlock it
actually granted consent against a present one.
B.

The Minority View

In contrast, a minority of the courts faced with the issue prioritized the privacy
right of the present objector over any consent obtained from a co-tenant. Sticking
closely to the literal holding of Matlock, the courts in the minority found the

70. 126S. Ct. 1515, 1518-19(2006).
71. Four Circuit Courts of Appeals held that the present objector could not invalidate a co-tenant's consent.
See U.S. v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977); U.S.
v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533-36 (9th Cir. 1995); US. v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979). A
number of state courts had addressed the issue as well. See e.g. Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Ark.
2003) (finding valid third party consent); State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wash. 1989) (finding invalid

third party consent in the face of a co-tenant's objection).
72. See eg. Love, 138 S.W.3d at 680; Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-205 (Wyo. 1991)
73 See Morning, 64 F.3d at 535 ("The rationale behind [the Matlock] rule is that a joint occupant assumes
the risk of his co-occupant exposing their common areas to such a search. There is no reasonable expectation
of privacy to be protected under such circumstances." (quoting Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688 (brackets in original)),
74. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75. See e.g. Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 687 (asserting that the outcome in Matlock "did not depend on the
defendant's absence for the defendant there had just been arrested in the front yard of the residence when the
third person's consent to search was procured").
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circumstances of a present, objecting target squarely outside the scope of Matlock.76
Consequently, those courts viewed the presence of the target as obviating the need for
77
third party consent altogether.
IV.

GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH: THIRD PARTY CONSENT FINDS ITS LIMIT

In its 2006 term, the Supreme Court squarely addressed whether the Fourth
Amendment governed a search for evidence based on the consent of a co-tenant in the
face of an express objection by the present target of the search. 78 However, the larger
question on the minds of spectators was whether the Court would continue with the
expansion of third party consent doctrine or begin to place limits on the government's
ability to rely on third party consent. To the surprise of many, the Court adopted the
minority view on the issue and declined to expand the doctrine further.
A.

Facts andProceduralHistory

On the morning of July 6, 2001, Scott Randolph's estranged wife, Janet, notified
police that her husband had taken their son away after a domestic dispute. 7 9 Upon
arriving at the Randolphs' Americus, Georgia, residence, a police officer escorted Mrs.
Randolph to a neighbor's home to retrieve the child.80 Mrs. Randolph informed the
police that she and her husband were having financial problems because of his cocaine
use. 8 1 She also told officers that evidence of her husband's costly cocaine habit could be
found inside the home. 82 The police found Mr. Randolph at home and asked him for
permission to search the premises, but he refused to grant it. 83 Subsequently, they
approached Mrs. Randolph for her consent, which she readily provided. 84 Once
inside, 85 the police discovered a drinking straw covered in cocaine residue. 86 They took
the straw to the police station, used it to obtain a search warrant,8 7 and returned to the
home to seize more evidence. 88 At trial, Mr. Randolph moved to suppress the evidence

76. See Saavedra v State, 576 So. 2d 953, 958-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), ajfd, 622 So. 2d 952 (Fla.
1993) (recognizing that joint control makes third party consent possible only when the target of the search is
absent); Pmnyan v State, 523 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
77 See e.g. State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wash. 1989) ("[W]hen confronted with [the defendant's]
presence, not having obtained a warrant, the officer should have requested [the defendant's] consent as well.").
78. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1518-19.
79 Id. at 1519. The couple had separated in May 2001, when Mrs. Randolph and her son went to stay with
her parents in Canada. Id. But by July 6, Mrs. Randolph had returned to the marital residence; it is unclear if
the motive for her return was reconciliation. 1d.
80. ld Mr. Randolph claimed that he took the boy away because he feared his wife would take the child
out of the country again. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
81. Id Mr. Randolph countered that his wife was the one with the drug problem. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
85. Id. Mrs. Randolph led police to her husband's bedroom. Id.
86. Id
87 Id. Mrs. Randolph withdrew her consent for the search when the police officer who found the straw
went to his car to retrieve an evidence bag. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
88. Id. Upon their return, the police found additional evidence of drug use, which formed the basis for the
defendant's indictment for cocaine possession. Id.
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obtained from the search, claiming that his wife could not authorize a warrantless search
of their home over his own express objections. 89 The trial court denied Mr. Randolph's
motion to suppress the evidence against him, ruling that Mrs. Randolph did possess the
authority to consent to a search of the home. 90 The Court of Appeals of Georgia
reversed, ruling which that the wife's consent was not valid in the face of her husband's
express refusal. 9 1 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed that decision, finding that a
contrary ruling would "exalt[] expediency over an individual's Fourth Amendment
guaranties." 92 The State of Georgia filed a petition for certiorari, 93 which the U.S.
94
Supreme Court granted on April 18, 2005.
.

B.

The Majority Opinion

Writing for the majority, Justice Souter began his analysis with the premise that
conceptions of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment tend to turn on "widely
shared social expectations." 95 This consideration of social expectations, according to the
Court, was evident in Matlock's emphasis on the reasonable inferences arising from cotenants' mutual use of the property. 96 Thus, the Court concluded that Matlock stood not
only for its recognition of a solitary co-tenant's ability to consent to the search of shared
premises but also for the idea that such a search's reasonableness is largely "a function of
commonly held understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in
ways that affect each other's interests." 97 By building its analytical framework around
the broad concept of social expectations rather than starting with Matlock's common
authority test, the Court ensured that it would have both greater interpretative freedom
98
over the case and an easier time justifying its ultimate decision.
Next, the Court set out to determine which social expectations were present in the
situation in Randolph, i.e., what could reasonably be inferred from the disagreement of
two co-tenants over whether to permit the entry of another. 99 It analogized the situation
in Randolph to that involving overnight guests, who have a legitimate expectation of
privacy because their host would be unlikely to admit a third party over their
objection. 100 Where co-tenants are involved, the expectation that one's objection will be
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 839 (Ga. App. 2003).
92. State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004) (quoting Leach, 782 P.2d at 1040).

93. 2005 WL 309364 (Feb. 4, 2005).
94. 544 U.S. 973 (2005).
95. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521.

Consistent with the Court's prior decisions, it also noted that such

expectations were influenced, but not controlled, by property law. Id
96 Id.
97. Id. For example, a child may have the power to permit police to enter into the "part of the house where
any caller, such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted" but could not be "reasonably expect[ed]" to

be able to authorize their rummaging through his parents' bedroom. Id at 1522 (citation omitted).
98. Of course, the Court relies on social expectations in its analyses all of the time. The unabashed nature
of its reliance on social expectations in Randolph is what is striking. For more commentary about the propriety
of this approach, see text accompanying notes 115 to 117.
99. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522.
100. ld (citing Minn. V.Olson, 485 U.S. 91 (1990).
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heeded is even greater, said Justice Souter. 10 1 Moreover, a reasonable person would not
take one co-tenant's invitation to be a "sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow
tenant stood there saying, 'stay out. ' 102 Given these guidelines, the majority concluded
that if no hierarchical relationship exists between the disagreeing parties, they must
voluntarily come to a resolution. 103 Where no such agreement is reached, a police
officer who seeks entry for purposes of conducting a warrantless search for evidence
would have "no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in
the absence of any consent at all."' 1 4 Randolph thus stands for the proposition that a
search for evidence conducted on the basis of one co-tenant's consent in the face of the
express objection by the other could not be a reasonable one. In other words, "a
physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive
' 10 5
as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant."
In support of its decision to discourage warrantless searches when present cotenants expressly disagree, the majority appealed to the "centuries-old principle of
respect for the privacy of the home." 10 6 It characterized the dissent as believing that
"privacy shared with another individual is privacy waived for all purposes" and
maintained that the privacy of the dwelling place is significantly more valuable than that
of a secret, for example. 10 7 But the high value afforded to home-based privacy concerns
is not just an abstraction for Justice Souter; it also has practical implications, namely that
police should not be allowed to take short-cuts when searches of the home are at issue.
Instead of ignoring one co-tenant's refusal to consent and forging ahead with the search,
the majority instructs that the police should pursue alternative avenues for gathering
information, like encouraging the other co-tenant to deliver evidence directly to the
10 8
police or provide information that the police can use to obtain a search warrant.
The importance of the Court's decision to couch its analysis in terms of social
expectations rather than using Matlock's common authority test became most apparent
when it attempted to square its holding in Randolph in that case. 109 From Matlock came
the notion that a co-tenant has the right to permit a search in his own right; 1 10 the
Randolph holding reached the opposite conclusion where an objecting co-tenant is
present as well. III Recognizing this inconsistency, the majority insisted that the "right"
discussed in Matlock was itself a product of the social expectations surrounding that
particular situation but "not an enduring and enforceable ownership right" like that

101.
102.
103.
and no
104.
105.
106
107.
108
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 1522-23.
Id at 1523. This argument assumes that police have no other authority to enter-i.e., no arrest warrant
exigent circumstances.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
Id. at 1528.
Id at 1523 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)).
Id. at 1524n. 4.
Id. at 1524.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1528.
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recognized in the (non-controlling) law of property. 112 In an effort to distinguish the
case once and for all, the majority emphasized that Matlock's holding applied to "absent,
nonconsenting resident[s]" only. 113 Where the target of the search is present and
objects, Randolph is the authority to be followed.
By narrowing the holding in Randolph such that it applied to objecting co-tenants
who were present at the threshold, the Court acknowledged that it was "drawing a fine
line" in the sense that a target who was away, asleep, or otherwise unaware of police
presence would lose out if his co-tenant consented to a search.1 14 In the interest of
simplicity, however, the Court concluded that such a result would be acceptable,
provided there was no evidence that police intentionally removed the potentially
1
objecting co-tenant from the entrance so that he could not object.' 15
C.

The ChiefJustice'sDissent

116

Chief Justice Roberts was not persuaded by the Court's use of social expectations
to circumvent an outcome he believed was dictated by Matlock. He saw the fine line

drawn by the majority as providing protection "on a random and happenstance basis" by
protecting a co-tenant at the front door but not one sleeping in the next room."' Citing
Matlock's reasoning that a person who shares a common space assumes the risk that her
roommate might permit another to enter that space, the Chief Justice concluded that the
consent of one co-tenant should be sufficient to make a search reasonable, even in the
face of an objection by another co-tenant.l1 8 He accused the majority of manufacturing,
through its appeal to social expectations, an unnecessary and unclear exception to
19
Matlock's validation of third party consent. 1
In addition, the Chief Justice vehemently disagreed with the use of social
expectations as a basis for future third party consent decisions. He pointed out that,
despite the Court's assertion that one co-tenant could not prevail over the express wishes
of another, the objecting co-tenant in Randolph nevertheless seemed to prevail over his
co-tenant's express wish that the police search for evidence. 120 Moreover, he noted that
the inconstancy of social expectations across various social situations makes "[s]uch
shifting expectations [an unpromising] foundation on which to ground a constitutional

112. Id at 1527.
113. Id. (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170 (quotations omitted)).
114. Id. The Court acknowledged that if both the targets in Matlock and Rodriguez had been asked if they
objected to the search, they would have had the opportunity to enforce their privacy rights, as Mr. Matlock was
in a nearby squad car and Mr. Rodriguez was asleep inside the apartment that was searched. Id.Even so, the
Court chose not to disturb those precedents. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1527.
115. Id.Ironically, Mr. Matlock was "removed" by being placed in a police car.
116. The Chief Justice's dissent was joined by Justice Scalia, who also wrote a separate opinion in which he
engaged in a dispute with Justice Stevens over originalism. Id. at 1539 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
wrote a separate dissent because he thought an entirely different case, Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
should have controlled the outcome. Id. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117 Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id ("Just as Mrs. Randolph could walk upstairs, come down, and turn her husband's cocaine straw over
to the police, she can consent to police entry and search of what is, after all, her home, too.").
119 Id. at 1532.
120. Id.
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rule." 12 1 In his view, social expectations are irrelevant because the Constitution protects
not social expectations but privacy, "and once privacy has been shared ...[it] remain[s]
private only at the discretion of the confidant." 122 Thus, a more consistent rule would
recognize that sharing a living space necessarily "entails a limited yielding of privacy" to
123
co-tenants who might in turn share that space with the government.
Chief Justice Roberts also warned that the majority's rule might disadvantage
victims of domestic violence by allowing their abusers to stop police from gaining
entry. 124 The majority dismissed this concern as a "red herring," 125 calling it irrelevant
to the main issue in Randolph. 126 It pointed out the Chief Justice's failure to distinguish
when police entry is permissible in general from when police entry is permissible for the
gathering of evidence. 12 7 The majority maintained that "so long as they have good
reason to believe [that] a threat exists," police may lawfully enter premises despite a cotenant's objection under the theory of exigent circumstances. 12 8 Hence, given the high
correlation between on-going domestic violence and exigent circumstances, domestic
violence arrests or investigations would not be stymied by Randolph's consent rule.
V.

RANDOLPH AS PRECEDENT

Motivated in part by the desire to avoid creating a rule which automatically divests
co-tenants of their privacy protection and in part by the desire to preserve the sanctity of
the home, the Court fashioned a very case-specific yet very thin line of protection with
its holding in Randolph. The case itself represents a notable move for the Court in terms
of curbing the disintegration of Fourth Amendment protections; however, its impact may
be lessened because of the specificity of its holding and by the inconsistencies in the
analytical framework used by the Court. What follows is a discussion of the
characteristics likely to mitigate and dilute Randolph's precedential value.
A.

Narrowness

The narrowness of the holding in Randolph illustrates just how little a majority of
the Court was able to agree upon. 12 9 The case "bitterly divided" 130 the Court, and the

121. Id. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test employed by the Court is grounded in part in the
Court's assessment of social expectations, as it requires the Court to determine what expectations of pnvacy are
recognized by society as reasonable ones. Thus, it appears the Chief Justice's separation of privacy and social
expectations, where the former is portrayed as solid and the latter is portrayed as ephemeral, is an artificial one.
122. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1533 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice continued, "[t]o
the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own
consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it a
private room or a locked suitcase under a bed." Id. at 1535 (emphasis in original).
123. Id at 1536. The Chief Justice argued that social expectations guide the Court's assessment of
legitimate expectations of privacy-the threshold inquiry for when a search occurs-but have never been used
to ascertain the reasonableness of context-based searches. Id.at 1532-33.
124 Id at 1537-38.
125. Id. at 1526 (majonty).
126 Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1525.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Justice Breyer cited the "case-specific nature" of the holding as a reason for his concurrence.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol42/iss3/9

14

Godfrey and Levine: Much Ado about Randolph: The Supreme Court Revisits Third Party C
2007]

MUCH ADO ABOUT RANDOLPH

six separate opinions it generated represented a momentary setback in Chief Justice
Roberts' objective of creating a more cohesive judiciary. In his effort to confine the
scope of the holding to bounds agreeable to a majority of the Court, Justice Souter
ensured that the holding's scope would not reach too far outside the case and left prior
precedents in place.
The third party consent rule articulated in Randolph will likely be applicable to
only a narrow set of circumstances. 13 1 For this reason, difficulty may arise when the
time comes to apply it to future third party consent cases. 132 The many components of
the case's holding-present, objecting co-tenant versus present, consenting co-tenant of
equal stature-provides courts with a number of facts upon which they may distinguish
the case. Moreover, the holding only applies to searches of dwellings-searches of cars
and offices, for example, fall outside its bounds. If Randolph is so easily distinguished
that it fades into the background, its impact will be significantly lessened and the case
' 133
may soon become "of almost no precedential value."
B.

The Social Expectations Test

Central to the decision in Randolph was the Court's reliance on social expectations
in its reasonableness assessment. The Court set out to determine which inferences
society generally attached to the situation at issue in the case; yet it is questionable
whether the social expectations the Court identified as controlling were accurate, let
alone broadly applicable. 134 It is difficult to discern what a society's beliefs are at any
given time, especially in a heterogeneous society, where beliefs are unlikely to be
consistent across such categories as race, class, gender, or religion. Of course, this has
not stopped the Court from declaring what "society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable" in Fourth Amendment search cases, 13 5 but such monolithic constructions are
no more supportable when used to invalidate law enforcement practices as when used to
defend them. Moreover, as a matter of opinion 136 and of empirics, 137 the Court has not
been a particularly competent judge of social expectations in its Fourth Amendment
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Breyer, J., concurring).
130. David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things The Roberts Court Takes on
the FourthAmendment, 2006 Cato S. Ct Rev. 283, 285.
131. Indeed, the case "concerned a narrow and relatively uncommon issue of Fourth Amendment consent
law" to begin with. Craig M Bradley, Supreme Court Review. The Case of the UncooperativeHusband, 42
Trial 68, 68 (June 2006).
132. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531-32 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Moran, supra n. 130, at 285.
134. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J, dissenting) (noting that "the majority has
no support for its basic assumption-that an invited guest encountering two disagreeing co-occupants would

flee").
135. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
136. Fourth Amendment-Consent Search Doctrine-Co-occupant Refusal to Consent. Georgia v.
Randolph, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 170 (2006) (noting that "the judiciary is poorly suited to determine rules of
social convention").
137. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in
Fourth Amendment Cases. An EmpiricalLook at "UnderstandingsRecognized and Permitted by Society," 42
Duke L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (examining the degree to which courts' and citizens' perceptions of privacy interests

differ).
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jurisprudence.
Taking a closer look at the expectations at issue in this case, the majority
confidently explained that "no sensible person would go inside" a home at the invitation
of one co-tenant when another co.tenant urges him to "stay out." 138 From there, it
concluded that Mr. Randolph had a reasonable expectation of privacy because no one in
his position would expect someone to enter his home over his objections. It is plausible
that under some circumstances a guest might be hesitant to enter a home when the
roommates disagree; however, it seems just as plausible that a guest might ignore the
dissenting co-tenant. As the Chief Justice pointed out, if co-tenants have commensurate
authority over the premises, it is as likely that the objecting co-tenant would not be able
to keep the guest from coming in. 139 Furthermore, while the majority noted that cotenants must come to a "voluntary accommodation" 140 to resolve the situation before
police may enter, not every roommate (or even most, depending on whom one asks) may
be as accommodating as the majority seemed to suggest.
It is also not surprising that the majority chose to use the term "co-occupants" or
"co-tenants" instead of "spouses" to describe the parties in Randolph, given that the
Supreme Court has traditionally held that the "laws of marriage and domestic relations"
are more appropriately handled by the states. 14 1 Nor did the Court characterize its
142
holding as an attempt to promote marital harmony, as some state courts have done.
Nonetheless, while the Court did not explicitly consider the Randolphs' marital status,
that fact likely played some role in the Court's social expectations analysis. As a longstanding social institution, marriage and the social expectations that accompany it have
evolved for centuries. Thus, it is a short step from the concept of marriage to the modem
ideas of equality and "voluntary accommodation" upon which the majority's decision is
based. Even Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that the decision is a reasonable
43
one because of the current view that spouses are equals. 1
Thus, the outcome in Randolph makes sense in part because it resolves a dispute
between two people who are married and presumably equals, and in part because the
search at issue concerns their marital home. However, any variation in the number of cotenants present, or in the quality and duration of their relationship, or in the location to be
144
searched would likely change the social expectations accompanying the situation.
Marriage, for example, is accompanied by fairly clear social expectations because of its
138. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1523.
139. Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1523 (majority).
141. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("[L]aws of marriage and domestic relations are
traditionally reserved to the states."). Of course, the recent federal enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act
challenges this longstanding view of marriage as a state-regulated activity. See I U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2000).
142. See e.g Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 837 ("When possible, Georgia courts strive to promote the sanctity of
marriage and to avoid circumstances that create adversity between spouses. Allowing a wife's consent to
search to override her husband's previous assertion of his right to privacy threatens domestic tranquility.");
Lawton v. State, 320 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (recognizing that a rule respecting the
objections of a present adult co-occupant is "more likely to promote peace and tranquility").
143. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. See id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
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long-standing history as a social institution, but relationships that are less common or not
socially accepted may not carry such clear expectations. 14 5 The sheer breadth of
possible interpretations with regard to the proper social expectations would preclude a
consistent body of case law from developing around such a foundation.
It has been suggested that the uncertainty inherent in the social expectations test
might be remedied by a return to the use of the common law of property rights as a
14 6
While both the common law and social
foundation for third party consent.
expectations are capable of changing over time, the common law's consistency and
predictability are qualities missing from a doctrine based on social expectations. The
common law encourages gradual changes through the use of traditional legal tools and
14 7
It encourages the absorption of
the development of a coherent body of case law.
14 8
With a
social conventions into the legal system "incrementally and indirectly."'
doctrine based on social expectations, however, the law is linked only to the judiciary's
perception of current social norms. Thus, the resulting law is only as good as the judge's
ability to discern current trends in social expectations.
Even so, it may be the case that reattaching privacy interests to property rights
would be even more limiting. Indeed, the main point of unlatching the consent doctrine
from property law was to broaden the scope of individual protections under the Fourth
Amendment. Now it seems that this breadth has to some extent undermined the
doctrine's consistency.
C.

The Muddying of Exigent Circumstances

In addition to these larger conceptual shifts, the Court was somewhat inconsistent
149
In response to the Chief
with respect to its treatment of exigent circumstances.
victims of domestic
disadvantage
may
holding
case's
the
Justice's contention that
despite present
dwelling,
a
violence, the majority stated that police officers may enter
objections from the suspect, provided that they have "good reason to believe such a
51
by citing a treatise
threat exists." 15 0 However, the majority obscured its position'
152
that suggests that in an emergency situation, the consent of a victimized third
excerpt
party would validate a warrantless search over the defendant's objections.
The majority's reliance on this treatise authority makes it appear that police now

145. For example, same- and opposite-sex domestic partnerships do not have the same history of social
acceptance as marital relationships do. Hence, people who participate in these alternative forms of committed
relationships may be denied certain privacy protections because of the lack of socially recognized expectations
in that area.
146 Consent Search Doctrine, supra n. 136, at 170 ("This indeterminacy-and therefore instability and
unpredictability-is the natural result of a jurisprudence untethered from its historical roots in the common law
and set adrift with only a vague mandate to reflect social expectations.").
147. Id.
148. Id. at 171.
149. See Bradley, supra n. 131, at 169.
150 Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1525.
151 Id at 1538 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
152 Id at 1525-26 (majority) (citing Wame R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 8.3(d), 732-33 (3d ed., West 1996)).
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might need "a good reason" to enter, coupled with "one occupant's consent," to justify a
warrantless entry and search during the period of exigency. 153 While the majority may
have intended future courts to treat the victim's consent statement as a potential (nonnecessary) component of the exigency showing, the majority's choice of citation
inappropriately seems to blend third party consent with exigent circumstances even
though each is a distinct exception to the warrant requirement.
VI.

FUTURE CONCERNS

Two important issues require clarification after Randolph: the limits on removal of
targets from the scene and the relevance of the plain view seizure doctrine to searches
conducted in violation of Randolph. The majority declined to address either of these
issues with sufficient specificity to forestall future litigation, thus ensuring that lower
courts will grapple with new challenges in the third party consent context for years to
come.
The removal issue involves a contingency placed on the case's holding.
Specifically, the Court suggested that the formalism of its holding-that an objecting
target must be present at the threshold to be protected-is a "practical" complement to
the rule in Matlock, provided "there is no evidence that the police have removed the
154
potentially objecting tenant" to prevent him from making a "dispositive" objection.
However, the Court did not describe what form this removal evidence might take, and
this omission generates a host of new questions. For example, will we see the
development of actual and constructive removal jurisprudence, similar to the analysis
used to equate constructive with actual arrests? 155 Will courts read into the contingency
a requirement of specific intent, such that officers who remove a suspect for the purpose
of keeping him quiet will be prevented from searching, but officers who remove a
suspect for other reasons will be in the clear? Will a good faith exception emerge,
excluding from Randolph's reach searches by police officers who sincerely yet
unreasonably believed they had not crossed the boundary from mere restraint of a target
into full removal? 156 In short, the ability of police to re-locate a target so that the case
falls squarely under Matlock instead of Randolph may blur the lines between the two
157
cases, particularly given the facts of Matlock.
The plain view issue stems from language in the majority opinion regarding the
power of the co-tenant's objection to forestall a search. The majority states that a present
target's objection is dispositive "as to him," a statement that "implies entry and search
would be reasonable 'as to' someone else.'158 In other words, when faced with an

153.
154.
155.
156
which

See Ill. v. McArthur, 531 U.S 326, 331-32 (2001).
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1527.
See Dunaway v. N. Y, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
See US. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (adopting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
deems evidence collected pursuant to a warrant later declared invalid admissible provided police

reasonably relied on the warrant's validity).
157. See supra nn. 40-42 & accompanying text (Mr. Matlock was placed in a squad car right outside the
home.).
158. Randolph, 126 S. Ct.at 1536 (Roberts, C.J & Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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objecting co-tenant and a consenting co-tenant, police may, on the authority of the
consentor, enter and seize evidence for use against anyone other than the objector. For
example, in Randolph police could enter based on Mrs. Randolph's consent and use the
evidence found to prosecute Mrs. Randolph but not Mr. Randolph.
Restricting use of the evidence obtained in a third party consent search to
prosecution of anyone other than the objector seems, on the one hand, to violate the plain
view exception, which authorizes police to seize obviously incriminating evidence from
places in which they have a lawful right of access. 159 Under this doctrine, if police
lawfully enter the house based on one co-tenant's consent, they should be able to seize
whatever is in plain view and to use such items to prosecute whomever is in possession
of those items, the objector included. In the dissent's view, 160 the majority opinion
prevents this result and therefore unnecessarily restricts prosecution of offenders.
A more charitable (and equally plausible) interpretation of the majority's language
would reconcile the two doctrines in the interests of practicality. Under such an
approach, while evidence found during a third party search could not be introduced
against the objector under the consent exception, it could be used against him if the
prosecution has another theory to justify its discovery and seizure. The majority opinion
recognizes that the consent of the co-tenant provides the police with lawful access to the
premises for all reasons other than collection of evidence against the objector; hence,
plain view emerges as a viable option once the police are inside and looking where they
are allowed to look. Thus, if police can satisfy other elements of the plain view
exception, they can use evidence seized in accordance with its terms against the objector,
despite his objection to the original search.
Consent doctrine thereby remains
appropriately limited but plain view picks up where consent leaves off.
In sum, while Randolph succeeded in clarifying the ability of police to search in
the face of a present objector, the majority's failure to be clear on subjects like removal
and plain view promises to generate much future litigation on a number of issues.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Randolph Court struggled to balance simplicity and functionality with the
desired level of privacy protection for home residents. It met with moderate success in
this regard, augmenting privacy protections for those who actively object to searches of
their residences but leaving multiple issues unresolved or unclear. The majority rejected
a bright-line rule proclaiming co-occupant consent as valid under all circumstances, as
such a rule might penetrate too deeply into the special privacy protections afforded the
home. 16 1 Yet it also left in place prior precedents-Matlock and Rodriguez-thereby
signaling that police authority to search based on consent would only be constrained in
limited circumstances.

159 Minn v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (Under the "plain view" exception, "if police are lawfully
in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if
officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.").
160. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1537 (Roberts, C J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1523-24 (majority).
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In the event that a sufficiently different case comes up, the Court might choose to
emphasize the case-specific nature of its holding and decline to extend it further;
alternatively, it might continue to reshape its third party consent doctrine in a way that
makes it a more consistent one. Given the variation in living arrangements among
twenty-first-century American households, Randolph leaves many loose ends with
respect to searches conducted in the presence of disagreeing co-tenants. The Court must
provide guidance to law enforcement while ensuring that the people's privacy
expectations receive adequate protection. This is of special significance to those in
alternative living arrangements, whose households may be in danger of receiving fewer
protections because they do not fit the more traditional nuclear family model.
Furthermore, because police still have several options available to them when faced with
an express refusal of consent by a co-tenant--entering based on exigent circumstances,
encouraging a cooperative co-tenant to bring evidence out to them, or applying for a
search warrant based on the cooperative co-tenant's statements-it seems unlikely that
the holding of Randolph will thwart a significant number of searches. In sum, although
Randolph marks a change of direction with respect to the expansion of police powers, its
ultimate impact on citizen privacy is likely to be slight.
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